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Chapter 2 
Down Under and in Between: Australian Security Perspectives 
in the ‘Asian Century’ 
 
Danielle Chubb 
 
This chapter will provide an overview of Australian perspectives on the US alliance 
in light of ongoing and emerging challenges in the Asia-Pacific region. After a brief 
discussion of the motivations behind the signing of the ANZUS treaty, the first part of the 
chapter examines the historical context of the alliance, with a particular focus on the long-
standing and ongoing tussle in Australia between independence in foreign policy making 
vis-à-vis broader structural constraints. While this debate has been a constant feature of the 
political scene in Australia, it has come into particular focus since the US withdrawal from 
Vietnam, which marked a turning point in Australian perspectives with regard to its own 
role in Asia. The collision of ideas surrounding Australian identity and Australian national 
interest has been reflected in policy approaches as successive governments have sought to 
strike a balance between the two exigencies and thus, most optimally ensure Australia’s 
strategic future. The chapter concludes by examining current perspectives through the lens 
of an ongoing debate taking place in Australian academic circles about what the rise of 
China means for Australia and its commitment to the US alliance, and considers options 
for caucus-style cooperation with fellow US allies beyond the hub-and-spokes model.   
 
ANZUS and Australian Security Perceptions 
 
Debate over the relative merits of relying on ‘great and powerful friends’ in 
Australia’s foreign and defense affairs is not unique to the contemporary strategic 
environment. The very negotiations that culminated in the ANZUS security alliance came 
on the back of a decade of discussion about the desirable direction of Australia’s loyalties. 
The war in the Pacific had left Australians anxious and the question of how to deal with a 
defeated Japan spoke intimately to Australian disquiet over the new geopolitical reality of 
post war Asia. The existential nature of these fears, prompted by a sense of isolation 
created by Australia’s antipodean location far from its powerful wartime allies, led to a 
desire to dismantle Japan’s military potential completely and impose severe restrictions to 
prevent any future resurgence. The US, on the other hand, was keen to expedite 
normalization of relations with Japan, motivated by a desire to have Japanese bases 
available to US forces for use in the Korean War.1 Some within Australia argued that the 
US and other major powers should not be left to negotiate the terms of the peace 
settlement, given their geographic distance from the heart of the threat.2 
 
                                                 
1 J.G. Starke, The ANZUS Treaty Alliance. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1965.  
2 The decision adopted unanimously by the UK and US in early 1941 (almost a year before Japanese strikes 
on Australia) to prioritize the European/Atlantic area over the Pacific arena, in the case of war in the latter, 
provided a sharp reminder to Australia that the protection of its security in the region could not be left to 
foreign powers, who defined Western interests to be best achieved through security in Europe and the 
Atlantic, rather than the Pacific. Trevor Reese, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States: A Survey of 
International Relations. 1941-1968. London: Oxford University Press, 1969. 
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Concerns about the level of US commitment to Australia’s national interests in the 
Pacific region accompanied the effort to create a regional security agreement in the 1950s, 
known then as a Pacific Pact. In the end, however, it became clear that Australia was not 
adequately able to provide for its own security needs. Acquiescence with the Japanese 
peace treaty was widely seen as a price for what became known as the Australia, New 
Zealand, US (ANZUS) Security Treaty, which was signed into effect in San Francisco 
Sept. 1, 1951.  
 
Just as the onset of the Cold War served as a motivation for the formalization of the 
Australia-US alliance, so too did a series of events contribute to debate surrounding the 
alliance’s purpose and future. No event was more influential in this regard than the 
Vietnam War. Australia’s involvement in Vietnam was justified in terms of ANZUS and 
both the Australian Embassy in Washington, along with Canberra’s Department of 
External Affairs, argued that ‘showing our flags’ in Vietnam would directly contribute to 
Australia’s national interest. The security calculations of such a decision are evident in the 
advice given to Canberra in May 1964 by Australia’s ambassador to Washington: 
 
[O]ur objective should be....to achieve such an habitual closeness of relations with 
the United States and sense of mutual alliance that in our time of need ... the United States 
would have little option but to respond as we would want. The problem of Vietnam is one 
... where we could without disproportionate expenditure pick up a lot of credit with the 
United States [by picking up] not so much the physical load the bulk of which the United 
States is prepared to bear, as the moral load.3  
 
Despite the bipartisan foundations of this commitment, the Vietnam War 
increasingly became an electoral liability. In the face of growing dissatisfaction and public 
unrest, frequent changes in strategies and tactics on behalf of the US left the Gorton and 
McMahon governments open to the accusation that they no longer had any independence 
vis-à-vis their foreign policy and were merely at the beck and call of strategic policy 
decisions made by the United States in an entirely unilateral manner.4 Australia’s reasons 
for involvement in the war became even more obscure in 1969; the newly elected Nixon 
administration announced its intention to extricate its troops from Vietnam and from 
Southeast Asia, warning its allies that the days of forward defense in Southeast Asia were 
drawing to a close. As the Whitlam Labor government was swept into power in 1972 after 
more than 16 years of conservative rule on the back of a promise to enact a complete 
withdrawal of Australian troops from Vietnam, serious debate about the value of the 
ANZUS alliance in a post-Vietnam world had begun.  
 
It is thus evident that the debate today about Australian identity and security in the 
21st century has been underway since Nixon’s 1969 announcement, referred to widely as 
the ‘Guam Doctrine.’ This new, apparently ‘hands-off’ approach to Asia by the US 
significantly shaped Australian perspectives regarding its own security future. Australia 
was not alone in this re-evaluation; then, as now, fears of instability following a partial 
                                                 
3 Michael Sexton, War for the asking: Australia’s Vietnam Secrets. Penguin: Melbourne, 1981, pp. 44-45. 
4 Joseph Siracusa and Yeong-Han Cheong. America’s Australia, Australia’s America: A Guide to Issues and 
References. Claremont: Regina Books, 1997.  
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disengagement of US commitment to the region led to a rekindling of debate among the 
Asia-Pacific allies about where their individual and collective strategic destinies lay. 
 
We now know that fears in the 1960s and 1970s that a re-adjusted US approach to 
the region would lead to a diminishing of its influence and a shift in the values and ideas 
governing the international relations of the Asia Pacific countries were in large part 
unfounded. Predictions of stability through greater interdependence have proven to instead 
have more merit. Rather than a fundamental balance of power shift, we have witnessed the 
creation of a new and complex security order in which states are bound together by a 
global market system. Survival of all states depends on the avoidance of conflict and the 
management of rivalries, which has allowed for the continuation of US leadership in the 
region. The US is closely tied to this system, as is China, even as it grows in both size and 
influence.   
 
In Australia, this new reality has shaped perspectives dramatically and called for a 
reassessment of alliance obligations vis-à-vis a regional economic and political focus. The 
fundamental challenge facing governments from both sides of the political spectrum has 
been how to avoid stumbling when walking the fine line between historical security 
allegiances and economic and security futures. Different governments have displayed 
varying degrees of coordination of this balancing act. The overall result has been an 
approach to Asia that has been characterized as at best inconsistent and at worst 
hypocritical. This is in large part a mischaracterization: the apparent incoherence is simply 
a reflection of the difficult – and at times impossible – choices that policy makers have 
attempted and continue to attempt to make. In some respects, it seems to be Australia’s 
destiny that it will continue for some time to develop a somewhat Janus-faced approach to 
its own security. While the impossibility of the choices faced by Australian policy makers 
in the complex interplay between Australia’s alliance obligations and a commitment to a 
stronger regional role is largely acknowledged by analysts, some today worry that, in the 
face of shifting regional power balances, Australia will one day be forced to rectify this 
approach and choose between its economic relationship with an increasingly powerful and 
potentially belligerent China or its political relationship with a United States whose 
security primacy appears to be waning.  
 
The 1990s saw two very different types of political leadership in Australia struggle 
to fine-tune the balance. While the legacies of the Keating and Howard governments with 
regard to Australia’s relationship with Asia remain disputed, the striking dissimilarity in 
the rhetoric employed, first by the Keating Labor government, followed by the 
conservative Howard Coalition government speaks volumes about the struggle to define 
Australia’s identity and, in turn, national security interests.  
 
The decision by Prime Minister Paul Keating’s predecessor, Bob Hawke, to 
provide troops for the US-led 1991 Gulf War without consulting his Cabinet was one in a 
series of missteps that led to a great deal of public debate over whether the Australian 
government was taking seriously its newly conceived role as an independent-minded, 
Asia-Pacific power committed to nuclear disarmament and multilateralism. In response, 
Keating took up the question of where Australia’s foreign policy options lay and sought to 
redefine the national interest in the last decade of the 20th century, one that revolved 
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around an identification of Australia as an Asian power. His ultimate failure to capture the 
imagination of Australians and garner their whole-hearted support for his enthusiasm for 
this vision is multi-faceted. What is clear is that Keating had misread at least one element 
of the public mood: while Australians had been critical of Hawke’s mismanagement of 
alliance relations and demanded more transparency with regard to basing agreements and 
nuclear issues, these concerns did not amount to a rejection of old fears and dependencies.  
 
Instead, Australia responded to the challenges of nuclear proliferation by clinging 
ever more closely to the familiar US nuclear umbrella. While Australian business turned 
inexorably toward Asia and the economy became increasingly regionally interconnected, 
Australian mindsets remained firmly embedded in their Western identity. The mid-1990s 
saw a surge in anti-Asian, anti-immigration attitudes, illustrated most distinctly by the 
electoral success of right wing Queensland politician Pauline Hanson, who was brought 
into Parliament on a platform that harked back to the days of the White Australia Policy. 
Amid this resurgence of fears about Australia’s tenuous place in a globalizing world, the 
conservative Howard government claimed electoral victory, promising to halt what was 
posited by the new government as a wholehearted embrace of an Asian identity under 
Keating.  
 
In a symbolic move, the Howard government immediately reconfirmed Australia’s 
commitment to ANZUS. A traditionalist and a monarchist, John Howard represented all 
that Keating had promised to overcome: a white, Western Australian identity closely tied 
with ideas of kinship and historical allegiances. In the aftermath of the crisis between 
China and Taiwan, Howard had moved to secure US strategic commitment to the region 
and secured a joint statement out of the 1996 AUSMIN consultations that became known 
as the Sydney Statement.  The Sydney Statement affirmed the upgrading of US bases and 
the intensification of cooperation between the two countries on regional security issues. 
Analyst William Tow argues that Howard “thus believed he had acted quickly and 
forcefully during his first months in office to restore the regional-global balance in 
Australian foreign policy,” a perception that revealed itself in the ensuing years to have 
been chimerical.5  
 
Howard was to learn early on of the limitations of the ANZUS agreement and how 
closely Australia’s national security was tied to its independent role in the Asia-Pacific 
region. While Australia had wholeheartedly embraced the ‘deputy sheriff’ idea, it was to 
prove problematic in the Howard government’s early days. In particular, the ANZUS treaty 
was put to a real test in the context of East Timor. Since its invasion by Indonesia in 1975, 
Australian governments had been under an increasing amount of domestic pressure to step 
in and restore East Timor’s self-determination. Australia’s eventual peacekeeping efforts 
spoke volumes of the future for ANZUS and the role of both Australia and the US within 
it. While the US, under Clinton, was prepared to provide diplomatic assistance, it was 
unwilling to provide forces for a conflict that it would have difficulty justifying 
domestically in terms of its national interest. As such, while Washington provided 
diplomatic pressure to help persuade Indonesia to withdraw its army (and associated 
                                                 
5 William Tow. “ANZUS: Regional versus Global Security in Asia?” International Relations of the Asia-
Pacific, Vol. 5 No. 2, 2005, pp. 197-216. 
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militia) from East Timor, Australian and New Zealand peace-keeping forces were 
deployed in the ground. 6  Tow argues that the unfolding of the East Timor crisis 
highlighted the “gap between Western and Asian political and security approaches:”  
 
The Howard government’s initial difficulty in getting the Clinton administration to 
commit to playing a viable supporting role in [the East Timor] operation reflected its 
misreading of how much the United States was prepared to link the Sydney Statement’s 
rhetoric to any real American propensity to view Southeast Asia as a US strategic priority.7  
 
In the Middle Down Under? 
 
As the US ‘pivots’ toward Asia, debate in Australia has been portrayed as 
revolving around a choice between history and geography. This is a dilemma Australians 
have faced before, but never has it been so pressing. The urgency of the question is directly 
related to the rise of China, which most pundits argue is not only substantive, but also both 
ongoing and meaningful. The central question driving contemporary debate is: how can 
Australia continue to benefit from China’s economic rise and simultaneously secure its 
own national interests? A range of responses have arisen about where Australia’s national 
interests lie and which mechanisms will best achieve them. On one side of the spectrum is 
the argument that, in light of the inevitable decline in US influence in Asia, Australia 
(along with other regional powers) needs to dramatically reassess its alliance obligations to 
take stock of the shifting power balance, away from the US-centered order to one that is 
increasingly multipolar. On the other side is the argument that, in fact, the close economic 
interdependence of all states, including the US and China, actually leads to an increased 
likelihood that cooperation, rather than conflict, will become the new default order in Asia.  
 
It is however between these two extremes that most debate lies. This debate 
revolves around competing visions of the future of Australia and Australian identity in 
what has been dubbed the ‘Asian Century.’ Here, the febrile nature of the security arena is 
acknowledged to have created the exigency for the careful management of Australia’s 
relationship with China, which in turn paints the backdrop for considerations of how the 
Australia-US alliance can continue to shape Australia’s future. It is the apparent 
incompatibility of these goals, and the clumsy manner in which Australian governments 
have dealt with this difficult scenario, that has led to the accusations of incoherence that 
are outlined above. The most recent announcement regarding an increased US presence in 
Australia (discussed below) is a case in point: widely seen as an effort to consolidate 
America’s influence in the Western Pacific in response to China’s growing influence, both 
Australian and US policy makers fumbled publicly as they sought to make assurances, in 
press conferences and official statements, that this was not intended as a containment of 
China.  
 
Since 2008, the Rudd/Gillard government has put in place a number of initiatives, 
in response to accusations that Australia has been slow to come to terms with the national 
                                                 
6  In September 1999, under the command of Australian Maj. Gen. Peter Cosgrove, a UN-mandated, 
multinational peacekeeping force (INTERFET – International Force for East Timor) made up primarily of 
Australian and New Zealand forces was deployed in East Timor tasked with restoring peace and security. 
7 Tow, pp. 197-216. 
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security implications of China’s rise. Most recent of these is the commissioning of the 
Australia in the Asian Century White Paper, released in October 2012. The White Paper’s 
central goal is to provide a set of recommendations for how Australia should adjust its 
horizons to prepare itself in face of the global shift of economic and strategic weight to 
Asia. Whatever the findings of the White Paper – and its ambit is wide, as it seeks to 
provide a whole-of-government approach to the variety of challenges facing Australia – it 
is clear that the US alliance will remain the cornerstone of future policy initiatives. Calls 
by some within the academic and policy communities to respond to the shifting balance of 
power through acknowledging that the ANZUS treaty is ‘out of date’8 notwithstanding, the 
current Labor government has reinforced the centrality of this alliance to Australia’s 
national security interests. The November 2011 announcement of an increased US 
presence in Australia has served to further strengthen the country’s political commitment 
to this alliance. Under the bilateral, US-Australia agreement, US Marines – totaling 2,500 
by 2017 – will rotate through Darwin and the Northern Territory. It is in this context that 
Australian policy makers must grapple with the implications of the ‘Asian Century.’  
 
Long involved as a key instigator and supporter of regional multilateralism, it is 
through the establishment of cooperative institutions that Australia hopes to play a role in 
molding the coming new order in Asia. In the context of the US alliance, a number of 
opportunities are open to Australia in this regard. The US-centered alliance system in Asia 
incorporates a wide range of stakeholders, such as the Philippines, Thailand, the ROK, and 
Japan. At present, a hub-and-spokes model paints the backdrop against which Asian allies 
each work individually with the United States in the context of other domestic and regional 
pressures. Where cooperation between the allies – the spokes – is evident, this usually 
takes place under the leadership of the US – the hub. While this bilateral (and limited 
multilateral) approach to security is likely to remain valuable, key players in Canberra are 
keen to expand cooperative efforts in new and innovative ways.  
 
While budgetary concerns currently constrain a move in this direction, and while it 
is clear that Australia’s capacity to significantly alter the regional order is limited by its 
relative size and influence, the White Paper highlights the importance of these types of 
interactions. It is increasingly acknowledged in circles that extend wider than the 
Canberra-centric policy and academic arenas that have traditionally hosted such 
discussions, that rivalry among Australia’s regional neighbors will inexorably lead to an 
increased potential for instability and conflict, brought about by a rapidly changing 
strategic environment. As such, moves to increase cooperation between the US’s regional 
allies in some manner of a ‘spokes-joining’ exercise speaks to the dilemmas posed by the 
competing pressures weighing upon Australia’s policy makers; while increasing the 
diplomatic weight of neighbors who, by virtue of the US alliance system, share some of 
Australia’s values, and at the same time reinforcing the value of US presence. This is seen 
as one mechanism through which Australia may be able to make real inroads in achieving 
its own national security goals without significantly increasing the material cost.  
 
                                                 
8  Richard Woolcott, Australia in the Asian Century. Submission to the Australia in the White Paper 
Committee. 2012.  
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How would a more flexible cooperative institution, which moves beyond the 
current hub-and-spokes model, be beneficial to Australia and what would this institution 
look like? Informal platforms for cooperation, based on existing institutions such as the US 
alliance system, would allow Australia to participate in diplomatic initiatives that are more 
responsive to the dynamic nature of the current strategic environment, and thus, are more 
responsive to the needs of its participants, which are in a constant state of flux. Rather than 
replace or add to existing regional security architecture (with which the region is replete), 
the alliance network would provide the basis from which allies could caucus and create 
leverage. Diplomatic initiatives that take place within such a ‘caucus’ model would allow 
states to move beyond traditional conceptions of the bilateral-multilateral nexus that seem 
to be failing to deal with the complexity of the Asian security environment. The most 
exciting aspect of such a model is the potential for it to allow a more dynamic alignment of 
interests among states. As I discuss below, policy makers now widely acknowledge that 
states’ security interests are wide and deep in their complexity. No longer will simple 
calculations of strategic strength allow for the fulfillment of national interests, according to 
this broader definition of security. From the perspective of Australia, which sits somewhat 
outside Asia in terms of culture and history, and yet simultaneously shares with it a range 
of common strategic choices, the time has come to look beyond the status quo and re-
imagine a brave new world of cooperative partnerships with its neighbors who share the 
common dilemma of increased economic ties with China and a reliance upon the United 
States, whose influence is perceived to be waning, for their security needs. 
 
A further question is worth exploring; given the centrality of the US alliance to 
Australia’s strategic planning, what – if anything – would cause the alliance to end? Right 
now, it is very difficult to imagine such an occurrence. Even those hard-headed realists 
who suggest it may be out-of-date (or for that matter, those extremely optimistic liberals 
who place all their faith in the market), do not intimate in the same breath that Australia 
should abandon its most important strategic partner any time soon. At the very most, they 
are calling for Australia to reassess its strategic alliances and develop more flexibility in its 
foreign policy making. It is in this latter purpose that a ‘caucus’ forum would serve 
Australia’s interests, allowing the allies to develop symbiotic partnerships in ways that 
would better allow for an assessment of their individual, and regionally-focused, security 
needs.  
 
Any talk of such cooperation, among US allies, raises questions about the need to 
exercise caution in light of potential accusations that they are aimed at containing China. 
However, while perceptions are important, these questions hold within them a set of 
assumptions about the very nature of the regional order. That is, accusations that caucusing 
among US allies could only be aimed at consolidating the balance of power in Asia, in 
favor of the US (and against the rise of China), are predicated on an understanding that it is 
‘hard’ military power that is, and will remain, responsible for maintaining order in the Asia 
Pacific. Thus, the easiest response to accusations of containment is to reject the very 
premise of the question: the US alliance system should not be seen as simply a mechanism 
for helping maintain the balance of power system in Asia.9  
                                                 
9 Nicholas Bisley, “Asia’s Transformation, International Relations and Public Policy,” Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol.  65, No. 1, 2012, pp. 102-108.  
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The US alliance system is fundamentally responsible for assisting its stakeholders 
in meeting the security needs of their populations. Security, in this sense, is conceived 
more broadly than narrow conceptions of military dominance. It speaks to a wide range of 
what are commonly referred to as ‘human security’ needs – from transnational crime and 
climate change, to economic justice, poverty, and natural disaster relief. This reality was 
thrown in stark perspective in 2011; the US played a central role assisting the Japan Self-
Defense Forces in the aftermath of the devastating earthquake and tsunami. The idea of a 
caucus forum is thus predicated on the understanding that a greater integration of US allies 
would allow them to individually and collectively develop more independence in meeting 
their own security needs. As such, while this type of informal caucusing among US allies 
on the sidelines of existing regional groupings (such as ASEAN, APEC, or the EAS) is in 
itself valuable. It also has the potential to provide a launching pad for greater regional 
cooperation on more prickly issues such as energy security. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Australia has much to gain from the US alliance and it is likely that it will remain 
the centerpiece in strategic planning. It is in this context that Australia must grapple with 
the competing demands posed by the shifting dynamics of the regional order and an 
increasingly strong reliance upon China’s wealth for national prosperity. The interplay 
between Australia’s sense of identity, its stake in the current regional order predicated on 
US primacy, and the changing nature of its economic and security futures, is not a new 
one. It is, however, a dynamic that has come into recent focus with the announcement of a 
new basing agreement with the US and the release of a White Paper on Australia’s place in 
the Asian Century. Australia has an established reputation for relying on cooperative 
mechanisms for its diplomatic efforts in the Asia Pacific. Moving forward, the 
establishment of an informal caucus forum, which met alongside institutionalized meetings 
such as ASEAN or APEC, and drew on the strengths of the already established US-
centered alliance system, would allow countries with common interests and challenges to 
overcome the bilateral-multilateral cooperation trend that is proving increasingly 
problematic in light of the emerging multipolar order. Australia has a lot to gain from such 
a grouping, and while it would not allay the fears of those within the country who predict 
that conflict in the region is inevitable, it helps answer the concerns of those who argue 
that America’s Asian allies are mired in unhelpful patterns that have served to provoke 
fears of containment and are predicated on an understanding of the strategic environment 
that misreads the US alliance system as one that is singly focused on the projection of hard 
military power. The reality is much more complex and conceptualizations of Australia’s 
strategic future rely on a firm understanding that the security interests served by the US 
alliance are much more broadly defined and require innovative and flexible informal 
forums for the cultivation of dialogue that seeks to assure stakeholders that security in the 
Asia-Pacific is not a zero-sum game. 
